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EVALUATION OF THE CREW - COMMAND M O W I X  
POSTUNDING I.P?XRFACE 
By Harold J. Clancy 
SUMMARY 
Three separate  t e s t  s e r i e s  were used t o  evaluate the  postlanding in- 
(1) postlanding-systems t e r f a c e  between the  crew and t h e  command module: 
qua l i f i ca t ion  t e s t s ,  ( 2 )  water-egress-procedures developmental tes ts ,  
and (3) flight-crew water-egress t r a i n i n g .  These t e s t s  permitted in- 
vest igat ion of a l l  crew and command module postlanding-interface areas  
which inc1 uded systems , crew equipment, stowage, and egress.  
Crew capab i l i t y  t o  detect  uprighting system failures and i n  most 
C r e w  r epos i t i on ,  t o  cases,  t o  take remedial act ion w a s  demonstrated. 
e f f e c t  a spacecraft  uprighting, w a s  shown t o  be safe and e f f e c t i v e .  
Further t e s t i n g  i s  indicated t o  determine t h e  reasons f o r  uprighting 
compressor noise-level changes and t o  determine t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of 
maintaining only t h e  lower noise l e v e l  during uprighting f o r  reasons 
of crew comfort. 
The Block I1 forward u n i f i e c  hatch was demonstrated t o  be capable 
of permitt ing a Stable I1 egress.  This l i f t e d  a f l i g h t  constraint  
from t h e  Apollo 8 mission. 
The postlanding ven t i l a t ion  system performed adequately durilig t h e  
high-humidi%y in-tank tes t  with command module OO7A. 
recent addi t ion of a couch-strut lockout device compresses t h e  air- 
flow duct. Further t e s t i n g  i s  indicated t o  determine i f  a i r  flow i s  
appreciably compromised. 
However, t h e  
Spacecraft Stable  I1 a t t i t u d e  photographs with one-bag i n f l a t i o n s  
' indicate  t h a t  a s ide  crew-hatch egress may be f e a s i b l e  for  a s ing le  
y-bag i n f l a t i o n .  Single z-bag-side crew-hatch Stable  I1 egresses a r e  
not recommended because the  hatch is p a r t i a l l y  under water, and imme- 
d i a t e  flooding would r e s u l t  i f  t h e  hatch was opened. 
Night egress was demonstrated t o  be f eas ib l e  f o r  both t h e  Stable  I 
and Stable I1 a t t i t u d e s  i f  f l i g h t  penl ights  a r e  avai lable .  Further 
t e s t i n g  i s  indicated t o  determine i f  t h e  new cyc l i c  couch-strut lockout 
devices i n t e r f e r e  with a Stable  I egress .  
INTHGDUCTION 
To evaluate t h e  t o t a l  crew and command module postlanding i n t e r -  
face and t o  permit f l i g h t  crews t o  gain valuable operat ional  experience 
with postlanding hardware, a s e r i e s  of tests w a s  defined which encom- 
passed the  postlanding-systems q u a l i f i c a t i o n  tes t s ,  water-egress- 
procedures developmental t e s t s ,  and fl ight-crew water-egress t r a i n i n g  
( f i g .  1). 
Postlanding-systems qua l i f i ca t ion  tests were conducted i n  command 
module 007A. 
period i n  which t h e  spacecraf t  f l oa t ed  f r e e l y  at sea.  Crewmen on t h i s  
test  were astronauts  J i m  Love11 , Commander; S tua r t  Roosa, Commaad 
Module P i l o t ;  and Charles Duke, Lunar Module P i l o t .  Although t h i s  tes t  
qua l i f i ed  spacecraf t  postlanding systems, it a l s o  provided a means o f  
evaluating t h e  postlanding in t e r f ace  between t h e  crew and t h e  command 
module f o r  a 48-hour postlanding period. 
The major port ion of t h e  tes ts  consisted of a 48-hour 
In t h e  water-egress-procedures developmental tes ts ,  t he  water- 
egress f l i g h t  check l i s t  was reviewed, updated, and performed by using 
t h e  t r a i n i n g  b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A and by using t e s t  subjects  from the  
Flight Crew Support Division. These tes t s  presented a means of eval- 
uating t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  Block I1 command module t o  f a c i l i t a t e  a sa fe  
and rapid egress  f o r  any postlanding contingency. Per t inent  d e t a i l s  
taken i n t o  account included loose equipment stowage, acqu i s i t i on  and 
deployment of su rv iva l  gear ,  and proper handling of spacecraft  hatches. 
This t e s t  s e r i e s  a l s o  included an invest igat ion of crew reposi t ion as 
a method of e f f e c t i n g  an uprighting i n  t h e  case of a one-beg failure. 
Test object ives  incorporated t h e  determination of crew procedures and 
the  evaluation of crew vu lne rab i l i t y  t o  in ju ry  i n  executing these  
procedures. 
Flight-crew water-egress t r a i n i n g  i s  composed of 2 days of t e s t i n g  
f o r  each jrimary and backup crew on any designated miesion. 
day includes b r i e f ings  t o  t h e  f l i g h t  crew on postlanding systems, 
hardware, and procedures. These b r i e f ings  a r e  followed by two fresh- 
water t r a i n i n g  exe rc i se s ,  including both Stable  I and Stable  I1 egresses.  
Also , ?osA landing procedures are performed i n  the  egress- t ra ining 
b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A. The second day i s  spent at  sea  i n  t h e  Gulf of 
Mexico, where postlanding procedures and egress procedures are oper- 
a t iona l ly  performed. 
and procedures ( f i g .  2). 
The f i r s 3  
C r e w  debrief ings provide information on hardware 
3 
TEST VEHICLES AND FACILITIES 
Command module OO7A - b u i l t  by North American Rockwell - contains 
a l l  Block I1 spacecraf t  postlanding systems. 
t e s t ,  t h i s  vehicle  was i n  t h e  command module 101 configuration with t h e  
following weight and center  of g rav i ty :  t h e  weight = 11 779 pounds and 
x = 38.41, y = 0.27, and z = 4.79. 
module OO7A included t h e  uprighting s y s t e s ,  t h e  postlanding v e n t i l a t i o n  
system, spacecraf t  recovery aids (very high frequency (vhf') recovery 
beacon, f lashing l i g h t ,  sea dye, grappling hook, su rv iva l  r ad io ,  and 
swimmer interphone) ,  vhf /amplitude modulation ( A M )  communications, and 
su rv iva l  equipment. 
During t h e  48-hour sea 
The systems and equipment on command 
- 
Boilerplate  1102A, b u i l t  by t h e  Landing and Recovery Division at 
the  Manned Spacecraft Center, contains a l l  Block I1 postlanding systems. 
These systems closely represent  t h e  a c t u a l  spacecraf t  -audib ly ,  
v i s u a l l y ,  and t a c t u a l l y .  The crew compartment includes fl ight-i tem- 
emergency oxygen and repressurizat ion system mockup; pressure-garment- 
assembly stowage bag; f l ight- type oxygen umbilicals ; postlanding l i g h t s ,  
switches, and c i r c u i t  breakers;  main display console with dummy switches,  
switch guards, and o the r  protrusions;  and Block I1 steam-vent duct 
mockup. Stowable items i n  t h e  b o i l e r p l a t e  included a f l i g h t  t o o l k i t ,  
t h e  postlaxiding v e n t i l a t i o n  ducts ,  a grappling hook, and t h e  f l i g h t -  
configured su rv iva l  k i t  s. 
uni t ized couches; stowage areas A89 u3, R4, B3, B 6 9  Azl and B7; 
The b o i l e r p l a t e  hatches simulate t h e  hatches f o r  command module 101, 
both i n  operation and i n  appearance. The s i d e  crew hatch i s  operated 
by using a hydraulic gearbox with s e l e c t o r  pawls f o r  l a t ch ing  and un- 
la tching.  A pressure-actuated counterbalance system a ids  i n  hatch 
operation. Forward hatches are s i m i l a r  i n  weight t o  f l i g h t  items. 
Actuation torque values werz adjusted on t h e  forward hatches t o  match 
those of command module 101. 
was used f o r  command module 101 post- tes ts .  
A f l ight-configured forward un i f i ed  hatch 
The b o i l e r p l a t e  contains an uprighting system similar i n  operation 
t o  t h e  f l i g h t  a r t i c l e  but which uses tanks of compressed air  r a t h e r  than 
a compressor. 
obtain spacecraf t  uprighting t i m e .  
c a l l y  duplicated by two motor noisemakers. 
The airf low t o  t h e  uprighting bags i s  adjustable  t o  
Spacecraft compressors are acousti-  
Boi lerplate  1102A w a s  configured t o  t h e  following weight and center  
of gravi ty:  
z = 4.1.  
s l i g h t l y  d i f f e ren t  from those of a command module, t hese  values were 
obtained by matching t h e  b o i l e r p l a t e  uprightings t o  t h e  command module; 
t h e  weight = 11 740 pounds and x = 39.3, y = 0.1, and 
Because uprighting c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A are 
4 
thus ,  t h e  values are s l i g h t l y  d i f f e ren t  from those of command madule 101. 
The Stable  I1 f l o t a t i o n  a t t i t u d e  of bo i l e rp l a t e  1102A i s  shown i n  
f igure  3. 
Water Tank F a c i l i t y  
A fresh-water t a n k  i s  loca ted  i n  bui lding 260 at t h e  Manned Space- 
c r a f t  Center. The tank is 16 feet i n  depth and 24 feet  i n  diameter. 
Motor Vessel "Retriever" 
The "Retriever" i s  a converted landing c r a f t  u t i l i t y  (LCU) which 
was modified f o r  use as an open-sea t e s t  f a c i l i t y .  It includes a 
boom crane capable o f  placing t e s t  vehicles  i n t o  t h e  water and re- 
t r i ev ing  them. 
DESCRIPTION OF TESTS AND RESULTS 
Uprighting 
Nominal.- Two s t ab le  water a t t i t u d e s  a r e  concomitant with t h e  pres- 
ent  loca t ion  of t he  center  of g rav i ty  of an Apollo command module. 
are Stable  I with t h e  apex up and Stab le  I1 with t h e  apex down. 
apex-down a t t i t u d e  i s  undesirable because o f  a lack of ven t i l a t ion  and 
a safe-egress capabi l i ty ;  t hus ,  bringing t h e  spacecraft  from t h e  apex- 
down a t t i t u d e  t o  an apex-up a t t i t u d e  and maintaining it i n  t h i s  upright  
a t t i t u d e  i s  an important pa r t  of  t h e  postlanding period. 
uprighting system includes two 43-inch-diameter bags and one 34-inch- 
diameter bag loca ted  on t h e  upper deck, t h ree  bag solenoid switches,  
three bag solenoid c i r c u i t  breakers ,  two a i r  compressors, and two 
compresscr c i r c u i t  breakers.  
These 
The 
The spacecraf t  
The Apollo postlanding-systems qua l i f i ca t ion  tes t  w i t h  command 
module OO7A included a normal three-bag upright ing a t  sea and severa l  
failure-mode (two bags ) uprightings i n  t h e  calm-water t e s t  f a c i l i t y .  
These t e s t s  demonstrated t h e  capab i l i t y  of t h e  crew t o  de tec t  f a i l u r e s  
i n  t h e  system. The crewmembers can r ead i ly  determine when a bag has 
f a i l ed .  The side-window mirrors  allow v i s i b i l i t y  of t h e  l e r t  or r i g h t  
bag approximately 2 minutes a f t e r  it has begun t o  i n f l a t e .  Without 
using t h e  mirrors ,  a failure can be determined by a d e f i n i t e  r o l l  toward 
t h e  s ide  of t h e  f a i l e d  bag. If t h e  center  bag f a i l s ,  t h e r e  i s  no r o l l ;  
but t h e  command module does not upright within t h e  normal time o f  
7 minutes. Bag failures can a l s o  be detected by streams of  air bubbles 
5 
r i s i n g  near  the s i d e  windows. 
t e c t e d  because o f  t he  separate  loca t ions  - t h e  l e f t  side and t h e  
r i g h t  s i d e  of t h e  command module. When a compressor f a i l s ,  noise  
emits only from one s ide  of t h e  command module. 
t h e  a i r  compressors measured i n  the closed spacecraft var ied between 
96 and 99 decibels  reference 0.0002 microbar. 
t h e  threshold of pain (120 decibels  reference 0.0002 microbar) (ref. l ) ,  
it i s  i n  t h e  region of high annoyance andseverely impairs conversation, 
Compressor f a i l u r e s  were r ead i ly  de- 
The sound pressure of 
Although t h i s  i s  below 
During t h e  nominal three-bag uprighting of t h e  postlanding- 
systems qua l i f i ca t ion  tes t  (a t  sea), t h e  crew noted tha t  a consider- 
able reduction of compressor noise occurred when t h e  command module 
reached approximately 90' p i t c h  a t t i t u d e .  .During la te r  one-bag f a i lu re -  
mode tests, t h i s  noise reduction occurred within 1 minute of t he  up- 
r i g h t i n g  sequence i n i t i a t i o n .  
approximately 20 decibels reference 0.0002 microbar and brings the  
cabin noise  down t o  a l e v e l  much more conducive t o  conversation, A l -  
though t h e  change i n  compressor noise appears t o  be r e l a t e d  t o  system 
backpressure, f u r t h e r  t e s t i n g  is  necessary t o  determine t h e  p rec i se  
cause. Testing might a l s o  determine t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  and f e a s i b i l i t y  
of maintaining only t h e  lower noise  l e v e l  during upright ing f o r  reasons 
of crew comfort. 
This reduction i s  estimated t o  be 
Crew reposit ion.-  The one-bag failure-mode tests with command 
module 007A demonstrated t h a t  uprighting was only marginal f o r  t h i s  
case. To ensure an uprighting with a. single-point failure, t h e  tech- 
nique of crew reposi t ion was developed. 
more crewnen must move from t h e  crew much t o  a posi t ion which causes 
a favorable center-of-gravity shif 't  and thereby e f f e c t s  an uprighting. 
When two crewmen repos i t i on ,  t h e  change i n  t h e  command module center  of 
g rav i ty  can be as great  as 1 inch which i s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  change. Crew 
sa fe ty  was of msjor concern i n  t h e  technique development. 
varying magnitude can be imparted t o  t h e  crewman, depending upon t h e  
locat ion of h i s  reposit ioning. "he c lose r  t h e  crewman i s  located t o  
the  pivot point of t he  uprighting, t h e  less w i l l  be h i s  motion. 
determined tha t  a crewman wearing a pressure-garment assembly with i t s  
l a r g e  neck r i n g  and bulky f a b r i c  i s  adequately protected during h i s  
reposi t ion movement except when he i s  caught i n  a head-down a t t i t u d e  
during uprighting. A t  t h e  completion of t h e  uprighting, t he  crewman 
should be s i t t i n g  i n  the  lower equipment bay o r  l y ing  on t h e  a f t  bulk- 
head. It is  highly des i r ab le  f o r  t he  crewman i n  motion t o  know the  
moment when t h e  command module begins t o  upright.  This helps t h e  crew- 
tempted after complete bag i n f l a t i o n  because a one-bag failure does not 
preclude an uprighting. 
f a m i l i a r i t y  w i t h  uprighting and crew repos i t i on  t o  ensure crew safety.  
In t h i s  technique, one o r  
Motions of 
It was 
t o  avoid a head-down a t t i t u d e .  Repositioning should only be at- 
Operational crew t r a i n i n g  can provide s u f f i c i e n t  
6 
Uprighting tes t s  with bo i l e rp l a t e  29 and command module 007A have 
shown t h a t ,  unless  t h e  f a i l e d  bag i s  shut  down i n  an open-line bag 
f a i l u r e ,  t h e  remaining hags i n f l a t e  a t  a slower rate and do not  com- 
p l e t e ly  i n f l a t e .  
shut down as soon as t h e  f a i l u r e  is recognized. The crew can determine 
when t h e  remaining bags are i n f l a t e d  by l i s t e n i n g  f o r  t h e  bag re l ief  
valves which produce a gurgl ing noise  when unseated. The center  bag 
which has t h e  smaller  diameter i s  t h e  f irst  t o  f u l l y  i n f l a t e .  When a 
crewman recognizes a r e l i e f  valve unseat ing,  he can t u r n  of f  t h a t  bag, 
thereby increas ing  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  rate of  t h e  remaining bags. 
To el iminate  t h i s  problem, t h e  f a i l e d  bag should be 
During t h e  development of t h e  repos i t ion ing  technique, t h e  crewman 
had t o  be ab le  t o  re la te  a given bag switch t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  bag t o  
f a c i l i t a t e  the  shut t ing  down of a faLled bag o r  a completely i n f l a t e d  
bag. A t  t h a t  t i m e ,  t h e  upright ing bag switches were numbered one, two, 
and th ree  which d id  not re la te  a switch t o  a bag. 
spacecraf t  switch nomenclature was requested -from numerals t o  l e f t ,  
r i g h t ,  and center  of  L ,  R ,  and C. This change, which would adequately 
r e l a t e  a switch t o  a bag, was accepted and made t o  command module 1 0 1  
and subsequent command modules. 
A change t o  t h e  
Hatches 
The changes i n  t h e  Block I1 s ide  crew hatch have enhanced a safe 
and rap id  egress  capabi l i ty .  Emergency egress times have been cut 
from approximately 2 minutes Lo less than h a l f  a minute. With crewmen 
now reenter ing  without. pressure garments, egress  r a p i d i t y  h a s  probably 
been maximized f o r  postlanding. 
s t r u c t u r a l  changes could fu r the r  reduce t h e  egress time. 
Only an explosive hatch o r  major 
Only one minor problem, which was r e l a t e d  t c  t h e  s ide  ha tch ,  arose 
during t h e  water-egress-procedures developmental t e s t  series. 
was the  acc identa l  unstowing of  t h e  extravehicular  a c t i v i t y  (EVA)  
D-ring. The EVA D-ring i s  a t tached t o  a l i n e  and is  used from t h e  
in s ide  of t h e  command module t o  unlatch and t o  c loce t h e  s i d e  hatch 
t o  prevent exposing t h e  crewman t o  s o l a r  r ad ia t ion ,  The D-ring i s  
normally stowed i n  a machined piece of  Teflon. 
stowings, t h e  Teflon becomes .. *etched and does not  a k q u a t e l y  hold 
t h e  D-ring. 
opened by using t h e  counterbalance, t h e  D-ring came unstowed and caught 
on t h e  inner  l i p  of t h e  hatch frame. 
only approximately T O 0 .  
t h e  hatch inboard and by re leas ing  the  D-ring. 
gency, t h i s  COG 
This 
After seve ra l  un- 
Several  times during tes t s ,  when t h e  s ide  hatch was 
This permitted t h e  hatch t o  open 
The s i t u a t i o n  i s  e a s i l y  remedieC 3y pu l l ing  
However, i n  an emer- 
cut  valuable seconds from egress t i m e .  
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The s i g n i f i c a n t  difference i n  t h e  forward hatches of cordand 
module 101 and t h e  un i f i ed  forward hatch of command 103 necess i t a t ed  
t e s t i n g  w i t h  both configurations.  Two forward hatches were used i n .  
command module 101 - t h e  ab la t ive  hatch (50 l b )  a t  t h e  outer  extreme 
of t h e  command module tunnel  and t h e  pressure hatch (28 l b )  a t  t h e  
inner extreme of t h e  command module tunnel  ( f i g s .  j-1 and 5 ) .  
dir ' f icul ty  was encountered i n  t h e  unlatching of t hese  hacches. 
unstowing t h e  handle, t h e  crewman had t o  r o t a t e  t h e  handle while de- 
pressing a lockout button with h i s  thumb. On t h e  ab la t ive  hatch (where 
movement i s  r e s t r i c t e d  because of t h e  tunnel diameter and pressure- 
garment bulkiness)  , unlatching w a s  a problem, e spec ia l ly  f o r  t h e  small- 
handed crewman. 
emergency Stable  I1 egress , both hands could be used f o r  t h e  unlatching, 
and t h e  hatch simply could be permitted t o  s ink ( f i g .  6 ) .  
S me 
After 
Because t h i s  hatch i s  only removed i n  t h e  event of an 
Emergency Stable  I1 egress is  performed by flooding t h e  tunnel  a r e s ,  
by removing t h e  ab la t ive  hatch,  and by e x i t i n g  through t h e  tunnel  and 
up t o  t h e  surface of t h e  water. 
pressure across t h e  hatch t o  permit a sa fe  remciral of t h e  hatch. The 
command module 101 configured forward ab la t ive  hatch d i d  not contain a 
dump valve. To flood t h e  tunnel  on command module 101, it would have 
been necessary t o  open t h e  postlanding v e n t i l a t i o n  valves on t h e  upper 
deck. A t es t  was defined and performed t o  determine i f  t he  command 
module 101 forward hatches could be opened against  6 f e e t  of water 
pressure i n  t h e  event of a postlanding ventilation-valve f a i l u r e .  
data were obtained on t h e  torque needed t o  open these hatches against  
a waterhead. The la t te r  da t a  were used t o  adjust  t h e  operating force 
of t ne  mockup hatches i n  t h e  water-egress t r a i n e r ,  b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A. 
Results showed t h a t  t he  operating torque of t h e  ab la t ive  hatch w i t h  a 
6-foot waterhead was 93 inch-pounds - w e l l  within the spec i f i ca t ion  
maximum of 175 inch-pounds. The pressure hatch required 93 inch-pounds 
under i d e n t i c a l  conditions - w e l l  wi th i r ,  i t s  150-inch-pound spec i f i ed  
maximum. 
Flooding t h e  tunnel equalizes t h e  
Also, 
A s ing le  forward unif ied hatch has been adopted t o  command 
module 103 and subsequent command modules. This hatch i s  a combination 
of t h e  command modulo 101 ab la t ive  and pressure hatches. 
a t ion  of t h e  hatch is  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of t h e  s i d e  crew hatch which i s  
operated by using a gearbox and a r a t che t ing  handle. The s ing le  for- 
w a r d  un i f i ed  hatch weighs approximately 81 pounds and includes a 
pressure equal izat ion valve. A t e s t  was defined which constrained t h e  
Apol!-o 8 m i s s i r n  t o  qua l i fy  t h i s  unif ied hatch f o r  a Stable  I1 egress.  
m e  increase i n  hatch weight and bulkiness suggested t h a t  a crewman 
might experience excessive d i f f i c u l t y  i n  l i f t i n g  and stowing t h e  'latch 
f r 3 m  t h e  tunnel while su i t ed  i n  an i n t eg ra t ed  thermal meteoroid garment. 
Test, results showed t h a t  t he  hatch,  with i t s  long unlatching handle 
and short  s t roke ,  i s  s ign i f i can t ly  e a s i e r  t o  unlatch underwater than 
The oper- 
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the  comand module 101 configured hatch. Because t h e  hatch i s  under wa- 
t e r  while inside t h e  t u n n e l ,  i t s  weight i s  reduced t o  29 pounds and can be 
e a s i l y  l i f t e d .  A t  t h e  top of t he  tunnel ,  some in t e r f e rence  i s  encountered 
with t h e  oxygen umbilicals which protrude s l i g h t i y  i n t o  t h e  tunnel  enve- 
lope. However, by s l i g h t l y  t i l t i n g  the  hatch,  it can be l i f t e d  past  t he  
unb i l i ca l s .  Outside the  tunnel,  t h e  hatch can be r o l l e d  and stowed i n  the  
aft equipnent bay next t a  t h e  couch of t h e  Lunar Module P i l o t .  If nec- 
essary,  a second crewman can a i d  i n  t h e  hatch removal. "he w a t e r  l e v e l  
inside the  tunnel w a s  approximately 3 inches lover  than when t h e  post- 
landing ven t i l a t ion  valves were used t o  flood t h e  t -amel .  The hatch w a s  
demonstrated t o  be adequate f o r  t h i s  mode of egress; and t h e  f l i g h t  con- 
s t r a i n t  f o r  t h e  second manned mission was l i f t e d  ( f i g .  1). 
Couches 
m e  couches used i n  cornand module 101  d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  from 
those of subsequent command modules. Both configurations were t e s t e d ,  
and evaluations vere nade concerning crew comfort during a 48-hour 
postlanding period and concerning couch in t e r f e rence  during egress.  
The 48-hour command module 007A- sea  tes t  demonstrated t h e  adequacy 
of t h e  command module 101 un i t i zed  hard couch. 
comfort w a s  enhanced by placing all three sea t  pa- . i n  t h e  180° posi t ion 
and by using panels o r  stowage boxes t o  extend t h e  couch t o  the aft 
equipment-bay w a l l  f o r  lower l e g  support. With t h e  foldable  keadrest ,  
these couches allowed some mobili ty i n  t h e  area between the  head of t h e  
couches and the  s ide  hatch. "he couch s t r u t s  did cut  down on crew 
d o b i l i t y  during egress by forcing t h e  two s i d e  crewmen t o  move to t h e  
center couch t o  egress from t h e  s i d e  hatch. 
During t h e  t e s t ,  couch 
The foldable crew couch, which i s  on cornand modules subsequent 
t o  command module 101, w a s  evaluated i n  a series of tests with t h e  
egress t r a i n e r  b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A. 
were s ign i f i can t ly  e a s i e r  t o  operate than the  un i t i zed  set flown on 
cmmand module 101. 
a r e  approximately equal,  t h e  individual  foldable  couch is s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
l i g h t e r  and thereby e a s i e r  t o  handle. This i s  apparent i n  t h e  seat pan 
of t he  uni t ized couch which is d i f f i c u l t  t o  operate i n  one g because 
of i t s  weight. 
Testing indicatzd t h a t  t hese  couches 
Although t h e  t .otal  weight of t h e  s e t s  of couches 
The nonstovable headrest and protruding frame of che foldable  
couch s ign i f i can t ly  reduce t h e  working a rea  available between t h e  head 
o f  t he  couch and t h e  s ide  crew hatch. Even t h e  crewman without a 
pressure-garment assemblj- f inds it d i f f i c u l t  t o  stand i n  t h i s  area t o  
remove t h e  side-hatch dump valve f o r  grappling hook deployment and 
f o r  ncrmal hatch opening. 
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The c y c l i c  s t r u t s  developd. f o r  csmand module 103 and t h e  sub- 
sequent command modules include a locirout device which i s  unlocked on 
main chutes. Ekcause 2f tile LlAki:?ess  ~f th? IGckmt device,  questions 
have a r i s e n  as t o  possible  egress i r i t i r fe rence .  Although any in t e r -  
ference i s  thought t o  be r s i E : k a L ,  rri>Gup m i t s  have been ordered; and 
tes ts  w i l l  be i n i t i a t e d  t o  evaluate e ~ e s s  envelope in te r fe rence .  
SWitciies and Ci rcu i t  3realrera 
T e s t i n g  i n  b o i l e r p l a t e  i lO2k and command module 007A has shown t h a t  
t h e  center (Command Module P i l o t )  right-hand (Lunar Module P i l o t )  
crewmen are &able t o  reach t h z  ‘iFrig?iTing bag switches when strapped 
i n  t h e i r  couches. Bowever, crew reposi t ion tes t s  have demonstrated 
t h e  capab i l i t y  of a crewman t o  cont ro l  h i s  x v e n e n t s  i n s ide  a spacecraft 
i n  nominal sea states (3 t o  5 ft). Beca..,e ;.-entry i s  no6 Serformed 
without pressure gaments ,  a crewman has t::e 7 3 b i l i t y  ar.d capab i l i t y  
t o  unstrap,  t o  move across t h e  spscec ra f t ,  and t; operate t h e  upright ing 
system while ir, t h e  S tab le  11 a t t i t u d e .  
Postlanding cabin l i g h t i n g  is  supylied by tvo f lood l igh t s .  One 
f lood l igh t  i s  located a.bove t h e  head o f  t h e  Comander near t h e  rendez- 
vous window; t h e  o ther  f loo3l igi i t  i s  located at t h e  head of t h e  crew 
couches between t h e  Commvlder a n d  t he  Cormand Module Pilot . .  These 
l i g h t s  provide exce l len t  i l l u n i n a t i o n  f o r  t h e  majority of postlanding 
switches, namely t h e  main d isp lay  console p a e l s  numbers 8 and 15. 
Only one of t h e  ereas containing t2e  :iast,I.sr.iinp c i rc l i i t  breakers 
i s  poorly i l luminated. This is  par,el nuriser 250 which i s  loca t ed  i n  
t h e  lower right-hand equipment bay znd contains t h e  following c i r c u i t  
breakers : c i r c u i t  breaker pyrotechnic A seq:ience A , c i r c u i t  breaker 
pyrotechnic B sequence B ,  b a t t e r y  A p o w r  e a t r y  and postlanding, bat- 
t e r y  B power en t ry  w.d postlanding, a r ~ d  b a t t e r y  C power en t ry  and 
postlanding (appendixes A and B). Although i l luminat ion i n  t h i s  area 
with t h e s e  c i r c u i t  breakers t o  know t h e i r  l oca t ion ,  o r  t h e  f l i g h t  
penlights may be used t o  overcome d i f f i c u l t i e s .  
. is poor, it i s  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  appyopriate crewman i s  f ami l i a r  enough 
Pr ior  t o  t h e  Apollo 8 mission, two t e s t s  were conducted t o  deter-  
mine problem areas associated with night egress .  
S tab le  I1 emergency egresses were performed from b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A 
i n  t h e  test tank f a c i l i t y .  kL1 building l i g h t s  were turned o f f .  
Both S tab le  I and 
The Stable  I tes t  demonstrated t h e  adequacy o f  t he  cabin l i g h t i n g  
f o r  emergency night egress .  S l igh t  probisns were encountered when 
10 
deploying t h e  ra f t  and when egressing i n t o  t h e  raf t  because of l o s s  of  
night  v i s ion  when looking back i n t o  t h e  cabin. Cabin penl ights  were 
usefu l  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  raf t  deployment and ra f t  ingressing. A penl ight  
taped t o  t h e  s ide  hatch would ai? t h e  crewmen when e n t e r i i g  t h e  ra f t  
and when observing hatch movement. 
The Stab le  I1 t e s t  demonstrated t h e  ..dequecy of  cabin l i g h t i n g  
fo r  t h i s  mode. The crew d id  obtain some minimal l i g h t i n g  on t h e  sur- 
face from cabin l i g h t i n g  through spacecraf t  windows. However, it was 
determined t h a t  penl ights  are necessary f o r  raft deployment. 
recommended t h a t  penl ights  be taped t o  t h e  w r i s t  of  t h e  crewmen t o  
preclude l o s s  of  t h e  penl ights  during sur fac ing  and raft i n f l a t i o n .  
It w a s  
Handholds 
Except f o r  t h e  tendency of  t h e  handholds on t h e  lower edge of t h e  
main display console t o  pinch f inge r s ,  a l l  o the r  handholds are suf-  
f i c i e n t  f o r  postlanding crew movement. Although no handholds are 
loca ted  i n  t h e  lower equipment bay and a f t  stowage area, crew re- 
pos i t ion  f o r  upright ing w a s  r ead i ly  performed by using t h e  z-z s t r u t s  
as handholds , when necessary. 
Postlanding Vent i la t ion  
Command module 007A was used f o r  qua l i f i ca t ion  tests of t h e  post- 
landing ven t i l a t ion  system. 
Apollo environmental t es t  chamber f o r  t h e  design l i m i t  case.  Specif ic  
t e s t  r e s u l t s  are ava i lab le  i n  t h e  Landing and Recovery Division System 
Test Report 68-219. 
landing ven t i l a t ion  system i n  maintaining a habi tab le  environment 
throughout t h e  postlanding phase of a mission. 
Tests  were conducted at  sea and i n  the  
The tes t s  demonstrated t h e  adequacy of t h e  post- 
The f i r s t  two manned missions have demonstrated t h e  need f o r  a 
Fol- change i n  procedure i r r  t h e  postlanding ven t i l a t ion  operation. 
lowing both missions,  t h e  ven t i l a t ion  valves were left  open a f t e r  
powerdown and af ter  crew egress  because t h e  main power c i r c u i t  breakers 
were pul led before  &he ventJlation switch was turned o f f .  
l a t i o n  valves are motor d r i r en  and requi re  a current  pu lse  t o  c lose.  
procedure should c a l l  out t h e  c los ing  of t h e  ven t i l a t ion  valves before  
powerdown. "his problem was pointed out t o  t h e  Apollo 9 f l i g h t  crew 
i n  a premission recovery briefifig.  Tests with b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A and 
command module OO7A and nis -*on r e s u l t s  have shown t h a t ,  following 
and 4. 
The venti-  
"he 
an upright ing,  sea water i s  % apped on t h e  upper deck between gussets  3 
When postlanding ven t i l a t ion  valves are o w e d ,  t h i s  water dra ins  
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through t h e  valve openings and i s  e i t h e r  blown on t h e  crew through t h e  
i n l e t  valve o r  runs down t h e  rear of t h e  main display console through 
t h e  exhaust valve. Although t h e  quant i ty  i s  small, t h e  problem of 
salt water corrosion could compromke cabin components f o r  future reuse.  
A new type of couch s t r u t  has been i n s t a l l e d  on command module 103 
and subsequent command modules which incorporates a lockout device. 
This device i s  !mated on t h e  plus-2 side of t h e  s t r u t s  and does not 
appear t o  pose any r e s t r i c t i o n  t o  comand module egress .  However, 
because t h e  right-hand x-x head s t r u t  i n t e r f aces  w i t h  postlanding- 
v e n t i l a t i o n  blower ducts , t h e  addi t ion of the  lockout device compresses 
t h e  center  duct k d  appears t o  r e s t r i c t  flow. 
the s t rut  change t o  postlanding-ventilation flow rates has not y e t  been 
determined. The use of duct extensions has been shown t o  a id  t h e  
cooling e f f e c t s  of t h e  postlanding fan.  
ducts beneath the  Commander’s couch appears inappropriate.  Because 
the  ducts are necessary only during periods of high heat load,  t h e  work 
needed t o  unstow and t o  connect t h e  ducts appears t o  p a r t i a l l y  defeat  
t h e  purpose of t h e  ducts. 
t o  the molded fan duct (as i n  Block I )  should be reevaluated. 
The s p e c i f i c  e f f e c t  of 
However, stowage of t h e s e  t h r e e  
The p o s s i b i l i t y  of a t t ach ing  the  extensions 
Sea Water Pump 
During t h e  postlanding-systems qua l i f i ca t ion  tests with comand 
module 007A, 
plug w a s  removed f o r  i n s e r t i o n  of t h e  s e a  water pump. 
module 007A had a Block I configured steam-vent l i n e ,  a test w a s  de- 
f ined  by using a Block I1 configured steam-vent l i n e  t o  determine 
whether t h e  sea water pump w a s  needed f o r  water ingestion. 
showed t h a t ,  even i n  moderate sea states, water co l l ec t ed  i n  t h e  Block I1 
steam-vent l i n e .  
bag without t h e  use of t h e  s e a  water pump. 
water gushed *om t h e  steam-vent l i n e  when t h e  steam-vent 
Because command 
Test r e s u l t s  
“his water was e a s i l y  t r a n s f e r r e d  i n t o  t h e  desa l t i ng  
During egress t r a i n i n g  of t h e  Apollo 7 f l ight  crew, an a l t e r n a t e  
means of deploying t h e  sea water pump w a s  demonstrated. By opening t h e  
side-hatch dump -Jalve, t h e  pump l i n e  can be deployed between the  valve 
and t h e  valve sea t .  The pump-line length i s  adequate t o  reach t h e  
water. 
usiilg t o o l  E t o  remove t h e  steam-vent-line access panel,  and using 
t o o l  B t o  remove t h e  steam-vent-line plug. 
valve provides an e a s i l y  accessible  penetration and r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  
working area; whereas t h e  working area beneath t h e  couches was confined. 
If t h e  sea water pump i s  r e t a ined  as a stowage item on t h e  spacecraf’t, 
it i s  recommended t h a t  it be used through 6he dump valve r a t h e r  than 
t h e  steam-vent duct. For f u r t h e r  information, see Landing and Recovery 
Division System Test Report 69-06. 
This method i s  much emier than moving beneath t h e  couches, 
Use of the  side-hatch dump 
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Grappling Hook 
The grappling hook i s  a device deployed through the  side-hatch 
dump valve t o  snag a l i n e  and t o  slow t h e  d r i f t  r a t e  of t h e  command 
module. Two problems were encountered i n  hook deployment during 
egress t r a i n i n g  exercises .  During removal of t h e  spacecraf t  d q  
valve,  t he  torque s e t  screws were extremely d i f f i c u l t  t o  withdraw; and 
i n  two cases,  t h e  heads of t h e  screws were s t r ipped ,  which prevented 
removal. This w a s  remedied by backing o f f  t h e  dump valve one o r  two 
turns  t o  reduce t h e  tension on t h e  Ezrews.  No problem has been en- 
countered when t h i s  procedure w a s  followed. The second problem in- 
volved the  "captive" screws on t h e  anchor p l a t e  of t h e  grappling hook. 
The anchor p l a t e  i s  mated t o  t h e  spacecraf t  by two screws a f t e r  removal 
of %lie dump valve. On two occasions,  when f l ight- i tem grappling hooks 
were used, one of t h e  capt ive screws dropped out of t h e  anchor p l a t e  
p r i o r  t o  spacecraft  attachment. It has not been determined whether 
loss of these screws w a s  caused by f a u l t y  design of t h e  washer r e t a i n e r ,  
improper handling, o r  excessive use of t h e  hooks. 
Egress 
Because of command module changes from Block I t o  Block 11, an 
egress-procedures-verification t e s t  s e r i e s  w a s  conducted, as i n  Block I 
( r e f .  2 ) .  
w i t h  differences r e l a t i n g  mainly t o  t h e  opening of t h e  new unif ied s ide  
hatch. Stable  I1 egress w a s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a l t e r e d  by removal of t he  
postlanding v e n t i l a t i o n  valves from the  forward hatch i n  Block I t o  t h e  
upper deck on Block 11, by t h e  inclusion of t h e  double forward hatch 
on command module 101, and by inclusion of t h e  forward un i f i ed  hatch 
w i t h  i n t eg ra t ed  pressure equal izat ion valve on command module 103 and 
subsequent command modules ( f i g s .  7 t o  10). 
Stable  I egress remained e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same as i n  Block I 
Although Stable I and Stable  I1 egress procedures had been inves t i -  
gated and v e r i f i e d ,  questions remained concerning t h e  procedure t o  be 
used i n  t h e  case of a p a r t i a l l y  uprighted spacecraf t .  
were FerfOITfIed (by using b o i l e r p l a t e  29A) t o  determine t h e  pos i t i on  of 
spacecraft  hatches i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  water l e v e l s .  In each t e s t ,  only 
one bag was i n f l a t e d .  Photographs show t h a t  a Stable  I1 egress i s  
necessary i f  only t h e  z-bag i n f l a t e s  because t h e  s ide  hatch remains 
below the  water l e v e l .  However, i n  t he  case of a s i n g l e  y-bag in- 
f l a t i o n ,  it appears t h a t  a s i d e  crew-hatch egress could be performed 
because i n  t h i s  case,  t h e  s i d e  hatch i s  above the  water l ine.  Some 
questions remain as t o  whether an uprighting can be e f f ec t ed  with one 
i n f l a t e d  y-bag and with th ree  crewmen reposi t ioning.  
would c l a r i f y  these  questions and would determine whether two o r  t h ree  
Several  t e s t s  
Further t e s t s  
13 
modes of egress are necessary. 
tude is shown i n  figure 11. 
The b o i l e r p l a t e  29A single-bag att i-  
During egress  t e s t i n g ,  f l ight-configured su rv iva l  k i t s  were used. 
These k i t s  contain su rv iva l  items such as water, f l a sh ing  l i g h t ,  sun- 
g las ses ,  raf't , r ad io ,  sunbonnet, s i g n a l  mirror, f i sh ing  apparatus,  and 
knife. Some d i f f i c u l t i e s  were encountered with lanyard entanglement. 
This problem is fe l t  t o  be one of crew inexperience and not a design 
deficiency of the  su rv iva l  equipment system. Another problem involving 
l o s s  of carbon dioxide during raft and l i f e v e s t  i n f l a t i o n  w a s  r e c t i f i e d  
by a design change i n  t h e  carbon dioxide cyl inder  plunger-inflation 
mechanism. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Apollo postlanding i n t e r f a c e  between man and machine has been 
The crew reposi t ioning technique 
tested and has been demonstrated t o  be adequate. Uprighting system 
failures are detectable  by the crew. 
has been demonstrated t o  be safe and has shown that  t h e  crewmen are 
cepable of con t ro l l i ng  t h e i r  motions i n  a dynamic command module. Crew- 
men i n  the  process of reposi t ioning should be warned when the  spacecraf t  
begins t o  upright.  
No s i g n i f i c a n t  problems were encountered with the  hatches. I n  
ramoving the dump valve f o r  grappling hook deployment, it i s  advisable 
t o  back o f f  the  valve one o r  two tu rns  t o  ease the tension on the  
screws. 
Foldable couches were more e a s i l y  operated than t h e  un i t i zed  
couch of command module 101; t he  comfort l e v e l  w a s  e q u d .  
of the  foldable  couch frame toward the s i d e  hatch r e s t r i c t s  movement 
near the  hatch. 
ference problems - egress o r  postlanding v e n t i l a t i o n  - caused by 
the new cyc l i c  s t r u t  lockout devices. 
Protrusion 
Further t e s t i n g  is  necessary t o  determine any i n t e r -  
Several  postlanding switches are inaccessible  t o  t h e  crewmen 
when they are strapped i n  t he i r  couches. However, crew repos i t i on  
tests demonstrated the crew's mobili ty and capab i l i t y  t o  con t ro l  
movement i n  a dynamic s i t u a t i o n .  
Cabin l i g h t i n g  i s  excel lent  f o r  night  i n t e r i o r  s igh t .  F l i g h t  
penlights shduld be made available f o r  possible  nighttime egresses ,  
The sea water pump is not needed to obtain sea water when main- 
taining cabin integrity because the steam-vent duct acts as a water 
trap. However, if it is used, the cabin ventilation valve in the side 
hatch is a more accessible opening. 
REFERENCES 
1. Bonney, Thomas B; et al.: Industrial Noise Manual. American 
Industrial Hygiene ASSOC., 1966, p.  2. 
2. Clancy, Harold J.; and Dailey, Reed M.: Crew Egress Procedures for 
Apollo Block I Command Module at Sea. 
Paper No. 1213, 1966. 
NASA Program Apollo Working 
15 
. -  
Y 
- - - - -  
A 
d 
U 





, ,  >. I . , ,  ~ I - . 3 .  ..,.,_ ~ , , * )  . . ".. . . . .  -. - ~ .  .  . ^ " .  . ' - .., .. - '. 
. .  -"-. . . .  . . . . . . .  . . 






28 
Nominal water landing 
(harness on) 
Post landing 
c i r c u i t  breaker 
APPENDIX A 
Worst -cas e 
land landing 
(harness on) 
ACCESSIBILITY OF POSTLANDING SWITCHES AND 
C I R C U I T  BIlEAKXRS 
The following t a b l e  l i s t s  t h e  p s t l a n d i n g  switches and c i r c u i t  
breakers and t h e i r  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  crewmen f o r  both a worst-case 
land landing (50 f t / s e c  horizontal  ve loc i ty  - x-struts  s t roke approxi- 
mately 11 inches. and z-s t ruts  s t roke approximately 17 inches)  and a 
naminal water landing. The t e s t  subject  w a s  5 feet 7 inches t a l l  arid 
weighed 145 pounds ( f i g s .  12  and 13). 
or 
switch Crew- 
ELS -AUTO 
CB - M A I N  REL PYRO 
SECS PYRO 
SECS LOGIC 
CB BAT RELAY BUS 
DIRECT O2 
VHF AM B 
FLOAT BAG - (3  ) 
CB PL VENT 
CB FLOAT BAG 
VHF AM BCN 
VHF AM A 
PL VENT LOCK HANDLE 
PL VENT SWITCH 
CB MNA BAT BUS A AND B 
CDR" 
UPb 
CDR 
CDR 
LMP 
CDR 
LMP 
CDR 
CDR 
CDR 
CMP' 
LMP 
CMP 
CDR 
LMEJ 
1 
Crew- Ac ce s s i b ilit y 
Easy I CDR 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
LMP 
CDR 
CDR 
LMP 
CDR 
LMP 
CUR 
CDR 
CDR 
Impossible 
Easy CDR 
Easy LMP 
Access ib i l i ty  
D i f f i cu l t  
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Di f f i cu l t  
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Impossible 
Imp0 s s i b l e  
Easy 
a 
bLunar Module P i l o t .  
Commander. 
Command Module P i l o t .  C 
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CB MNB BAT BUS B AND EAT C 
CB FLT AND PL BAT C 
CB PYRO A SEQ A . 
CB PYRO B SEQ B 
CB FLT AND PL BAT BUS A 
A N D E  
CB FLT AND PL BAT C 
PL BCN LT 
PL DYE MARKER 
VHF ANT - RECY 
PL FIXED FLOOD 
CB BAT A ,  B, C PWR ENTIPL 
Worst-case 
Pos tlanding 
circuit breaker 
or 
switch 
I I I I 
LMP LMP Easy 
LMP I;..> Easy 
LMP LMP Impossible 
LMP LMP Impossible 
LMP LMP Easy 
LMP LMP Easy 
CDR CDR Impossible 
CDR CDR Impossible 
LKP LMP Impossible 
CDR CDR Easb 
LMP LMP Impossible 
I ‘FZ- I Accessibility I ‘rz- I Accessibility 
Easy 
Easy 
Impossible 
Impos Bible 
Easy 
Easy 
Easy 
Difficult 
Easy 
Impossible 
E=Y 
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APPENDIX B 
A SECTION OF THE FLIGHT CREW CHECKLIST 
Crewman 
CDR 
LMP 
CDR 
UlP 
ALL 
CDR 
LMP 
CDR 
LMP 
CMP 
POSTLANDING AND WATER EGRESS 
1. S t a b i l i z a t i o n  a f te r  landing 
ELS - AUTO ( v e r i f y ) .  
CB MAIN REL PYRO (both) - CLOSE 
MAIN RELEASE - on (up) 
SECS PYRO (both)  - SAFE 
SECS LOGIC (both) - OFF 
CB BAT RLY BUS (2)  - OPEN 
Helmet off  ( i f  s u i t e d )  
DIRECT O2 - CLOSE (CW) ( i f  s u i t e d )  
VHF AM B - OFF (cen te r )  
CB PL VENT - CLOSE 
CB FLOAT BAG (3) - CLOSE 
If Stable I1 
FLOAT BAG (3) - FILL till 2 min a f t e r  
upright ,  then - OFF 
VHF AM A - OFF while inverted 
VHP AM BCN - OFF while inverted 
If Stable  I 
After  10 min cooling period, 
FLOAT BAG ( 3 )  - FILL 7 mia 
FLOAT BAG ( 3) - OFF 
Panel 
2 
8 
3 
8 
2. Post S t a b i l i z a t i o n  and Vent i la t ion 
PL Vent v l v  ba2dle - PULL 
Remove PL ven; exhaust cover 
PL Vent - High o r  Low 
Release r e s t r a i n t s  (if s u i t e d )  
CB MNA BAT BUS A and BAT C ( 2 )  - OPEN 
CB MNB BAT BUS B and BAT C ( 2 )  - OPEN 
CB PYRO A SEQ A - OPEIT 
PL DYE MARKER - ON 
27 5 
CB FLT and PL BAT C - OPEN 
250 
CB PYRO B SEQ B - OPEN 
31 
Crewman 
LMP 
IMP 
CDR 
CDR 
CMP 
CDR, 
ALL 
CMP 
CDR, LMP 
CMP 
I%Ip 
CDR 
CMP 
EACH HR - CHECK DC VOLTS 27.5 V 
CB FLT and PL BAT BUS A AND B ( 2 )  - OPEN 
CB FLT and PL VAT C - CLOSE 
If Not: 
GO TO LOW POWER CHECKLIST pg 2 
Unstow and i n s t a l l  POSTLANDING 
VENTILATION DI€JICTIONAL 
AIRFLOW DUCT 
Deploy grappling hook and l i n e  i f  req. 
3. Postlanding Communications 
VHF ANT - RECY (verif'y) 
VHF BCN - ON (ve r i fy )  
If no contact; with recovery forces  
MONITOR VHF BEACON Transmission 
with Survival Transceiver 
VHF Beacon not operating - 
connect Survival Transceiver t o  ANT 
Cable and place radio i n  BCN mode 
LOW POWER . CHECKLIST 
Panel  
. 3  
VHF BCN - O F F  3 
VHF ( 3 )  - RCV 
FLOOD FIXED - OFF 8 
VHF AM B of f  (center )  
VHF AM REC ONLY - A (ver i fy)  3 
COUCH LIGHTS - OFF 8 $ 5  
POSTLANDING MJT SYS: minimize w e  a 
SURV RADIO - plug i n t o  VHF BCN ANT cable 
COm and turn rad io  on i n  BCN mode 
. EGRESS PROCEDURES 
STABLE I 
Disconnect umbilicals ( i f  
Neck dams on ( i f  suited) 
Center couch - 270' pos i t  
Armrests folded 
Unstow survival rucksacks 
Open s ide  hatch 
PL Vent fan  - O F F  
su i ted  
on 
CB BAT A, B, C ,  PWR ENT/PL (3 )  - OPEN 
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Crewman Panel 
CDR 
C!lP 
LMP 
W, CDR 
LMP 
ALL 
C E P  
CDR 
CMP 
CDR 
L?? 
CDR 
Connect raft t o  S/C, i f  desired,  with 
green lanyard 
Connect raft white lanyards t o  water 
. w i n g s  and i n f l a t e  water w h g s  when 
egressing 
Qress with liferaft 
-“ut hardware k i t  out 
Egress 
STABLE I1 
CB CREW STA AUDIO (3) - OPEN 
PWR ( 3 )  - CFF 
SUIT PMR (3)  - OFF- 
Discmnect umbilicals ( i f  s u i t e d )  
Release r e s t r a i n t s  ( i f  s u i t e d )  
Couch seat pans (3 )  - 170° pos i t i on  
Neck dams on ( i f  s u i t e d )  
A r m  rests folded 
Survival  k i t s  removed from stowage 
Connect l iferaft  mainline t o  CDR 
Connect first white lanyard from 
Connect second white lanyard f ron  
Connect t h i r d  white lanyard from 
liferaft. t o  w a t e r  wings 
l iferaft  t o  w a t e r  wings 
l i fe ra f t  t o  w a t e r  wings 
Remove and stow f w a  hatch 
Exi t  feet first with rucksacks; when 
PBESSURE EQUALIZATION VLV - OPEN 
c l e a r  of S/C i n f l a t e  w a t e r  wings and 
raft 
i n f l a t e  water wings 
i n f l a t e  w a t e r  wings 
E x i t  feet f i rs t ;  when clear of S/C 
Exit  feet firs+,; when clear of S/C 
